Este artículo trata sobre las violencias entre estudiantes y las aborda como constitutivas de la conformación de un entramado de vinculación juvenil en la escuela media; allí donde se juegan cotidianamente procesos identitarios que implican la tensión entre identificación y diferenciación, a través de la re-constitución de taxonomías sociales. Dentro de la tradición de investigación cualitativa nos centramos en la perspectiva narrativa de análisis, en base a la cual construimos un esquema analítico que fue aplicado a micro relatos de situaciones (...) conflictivas entre jóvenes de primer año de escuelas secundarias de Córdoba, Argentina. Este proceso de análisis nos ha permitido diferenciar contextos relacionales de emergencia de violencias así como caracterizar distintas formas de manifestación y sentidos que adquiere para los actores que la vivencian, ya sea como protagonistas o como espectadores. (shrink)

Negli ultimi anni le ricerche sulla civiltà rupestre del Mezzogiorno medioevale, in seguito agli studi innovativi di Cosimo Damiano Fonseca, hanno condotto alla rivisitazione, attraverso approcci nuovi e con l'ausilio di strumenti sofisticati, di questo fenomeno nelle sue varie sfaccettature. Se, a partire soprattutto dalla fine dell'800, gli studiosi avevano rivolto i loro interessi in specie alle cappelle rupestri e alla loro decorazione pittorica, ovvero all'aspetto, in apparenza il più eclatante, dell'abitato rupestre, di recente l'attenzione si è focalizzata intorno allo (...) studio del paesaggio rupestre stesso e ai suoi valori, inteso come modello insediativo non certamente alternativo, né inferiore, a quello urbano, bensì come elemento specifico all'interno della complessa realtà dell'insediamento umano delle regioni meridionali e della Sicilia tra Tarda Antichità e Medioevo. (shrink)

(written in 2017) According to Dorothea Debus (2007), all emotional aspects related to an act of remembering are present and new emotional responses to the remembered past event. This is a common conception of the nature of the emotional aspect of personal memories, if not explicitly defended then at least implicitly accepted in the literature. In this article, I first criticize Debus’ arguments and demonstrate that she does not give us valid reasons to believe that all the emotional aspects related (...) to a memory are present and new emotional responses to that past event. I then criticize Debus’ thesis tout court for being a direct consequence of assuming a particular conceptualization of the nature of emotions: emotions as physiological changes. Finally, based on a different conceptualization of emotions that focuses on their relational nature, I propose an alternative framework for analyzing the different possible emotional aspects of our personal memories. This leads me to conclude, contrary to Debus, that some emotional aspects of our memories are not occurrent emotions but are better conceived as quasi-emotions. (shrink)

APLICAÇÃO DA ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO DIREITO AO NOVO MARCO REGULATÓRIO DO PRÉ-SAL.

En este artículo se trata de reconstruir el desarrollo de la idea de forma musical en el pensamiento adorniano a partir de tres textos fundamentales: “Evolución y formas en la nueva música”, “Vers une musique informelle” y “La forma en la nueva música”. A partir de ellos, se pone en relación la forma con la idea de libertad, la imaginación y el color, en cada caso, para mostrar la complejidad del término, así como la relación con otros aspectos clave de (...) la filosofía adorniana. Palabras clave: Forma musical, Theodor W. Adorno, Filosofía de la música, Darmstadt, Nueva música. (shrink)

En este ensayo me ocupo de algunos conceptos que son parte de una misma familia, a saber, los conceptos de mentir, engañar y desorientar. Uno de mis objetivos es ofrecer un análisis que sea afín a la perspectiva wittgensteiniana del lenguaje. Argumento que estos conceptos están jerarquizados y que “engañar” es el más básico de todos, dado que mentir es algo que sólo los usuarios de un lenguaje pueden hacer y el fenómeno del engaño lo encontramos en el reino animal. (...) El objetivo de mi análisis es establecer ciertas verdades gramaticales como la de que no se puede mentir sin tener la intención de engañar, que no es posible mentir usando proposiciones verdaderas, etc. Ofrezco una leve corrección de la definición tradicional de ‘mentir’, remplazando ‘creer’ por ‘saber’. Examino también la noción de mentira descarada y trato de hacer ver que en el fondo es una noción dispensable (por no decir espuria). Examino críticamente la idea de que mentir es siempre una acción condenable y ofrezco algunos contraejemplos. Por último, discuto la interesante cuestión de si es posible aunque no se le mienta desorientar a alguien con verdades y muestro que ello es perfectamente posible. (shrink)

La investigación reciente en psicología cognitiva sobre la memoria emocional ha estudiado las distintas formas en que las emociones afectan a la memoria, sin profundizar no obstante en la comprensión de la manera en que los aspectos emocionales, afectivos y mnemónicos se encuentran estrechamente entrelazados en el contenido mismo de un acto de reminiscencia. En este artículo propongo un marco conceptual de análisis que nos permite entender los recuerdos personales como recuerdos esencialmente afectivos, y que se articula en torno a (...) dos variables continuas e independientes: por un lado, la intencionalidad del recuerdo, es decir, el objeto hacia el cual el recuerdo está dirigido, que puede ser descriptiva o evaluativa; por el otro, la perspectiva afectiva del recuerdo, que puede fluctuar desde la perspectiva de primera persona hasta la perspectiva de tercera persona. Las dos dimensiones son analizadas en profundidad y las limitaciones de este marco y las futuras líneas de investigación son igualmente presentadas. (shrink)

The view of happiness that I propose in this article and derive on the basis of Aristotle’s and Henri Bergson’s ideas recommends that we must first understand life as an activity – not as a sum of accumulated experiences and things; nor a set of projects; nor fateful or haphazard events that befall us, but as a formative activity in which we play a key role. Ἐνέργεια or de l’action are at the core of life and it is by getting (...) a hold of this creative core that we stand to live happily (Aristotle) or joyously (Bergson). For both thinkers, the possibility of happiness and joy comes to the fore, to no small extent, as a certain orientation in our thinking, i.e., as φρόνησις and θεωρία, for Aristotle, and as philosophy for Bergson. Our thoughts inform our choices and actions as well as our view of the world, grounding our sense of meaning, purpose, and value of action. It is by reckoning with the ever-unfolding act of life and with our own actions in it (actions which can be vicious, senseless, and unexamined or creative and constitutive of a life well-lived) that we also take hold of the possibility of happiness and joy. (shrink)

New technologies provide great opportunities for cultural heritage to become more widely accessible and for cultural experience to be more meaningful. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the strengths and vulnerabilities of the cultural heritage sector and the need to accelerate its digital transformation to make the most of the opportunities it provides. The Commission Recommendation on the digitisation and online accessibility of cultural material and digital preservation (2011/711/EU) concluded that there is an urgent need to protect and preserve European cultural (...) heritage, and, in particular, endangered cultural heritage is still present. However, the diversity of legal approaches to cultural heritage by the Member States discourages the creation of a common European data space for cultural heritage as the European Commission recently proclaimed. In Greece, there have been significant efforts in recent decades to digitise and digitally preserve cultural heritage goods. However, the attention was not drew upon the accessibility and reuse of the digitized cultural heritage content. According to the relevant regulatory framework the existing rules on the use of digital technologies for the reproduction, use and preservation of cultural heritage content is obviously outdated. According to the paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 46 of the Greek Code for the protection of antiquities and cultural heritage in general (Law 4858/2021), a previous permission granted by the Ministry of Culture is required for the production, reproduction and dissemination to the public of impressions, copies or depictions of monuments belonging to the Public Sector, or immovable monuments that are located within archaeological sites and historical places or are isolated, or movable monuments that are kept in museums or public collections, in any way and by any means whatsoever, including Information Communication Technologies. Such permission is granted to natural or legal persons for a fee paid to the Hellenic Organization of Cultural Resources Development (HOCRED) upon the decision of the Minister of Culture, while the decision also specifies the temporal validity of the permission, the terms on which the permission is granted and the fee that must be paid. The production, reproduction and use of the aforementioned goods for other purposes, such as artistic, educational or scientific purposes, is again allowed for a fee paid to HOCRED, however, the fee can be waived upon the decision of the Minister of Culture. This Paper will examine the existing Greek legal framework and will attempt to propose an appropriate framework that will ensure open access to the digitized cultural heritage assets, enhance the recovery and transformation of the cultural heritage sector and support cultural heritage institutions in becoming more empowered and more resilient in the future. (shrink)

Drawing on texts in psychology, philosophy, and literature the paper argues that art avails us of a distance from ourselves. Art has a potential to change our perspective on monstrosity and to make us question our moral categories and presuppositions. The study focuses on a single painting by Paul Gavarni, Two Pierrots Looking into a Box (1852), which I have discovered holds two images in one representation. I turn to Gavarni's work in order to prompt a literal gestalt shift in (...) my readers. I direct the readers' viewing so that, at first, Gavarni's pierrots appear as handsome, albeit licentious youths, but then, through a shift in focus, I reveal their hideous, monstrous profiles. At this point, I argue that if we treat Gavarni's pierrots and the sorts of desires that they represent with single-minded opprobrium, then we run the risk of perpetuating the ugliness we scorn. There is, then, a double change in vision, which I seek to effect. The first one is the alteration of the visual, and the second, of the ethical perspective. The latter has to do with a realization that Gavarni's Pierrots can elicit from us — depending on how we see them — either complicity or reprehension, which is not so much a commentary on the drawing, as it is a reflection on ourselves (our biases, opinions, desires, values, etc.). The phenomenon that underlies the change in how we see what Gavarni portrays and how we, thereafter, relate to what we notice — the malleability of the human psyche — is what allows for and calls the many masking images we, ourselves, wear and perceive. The final question that I address in the paper is whether we can claim mastery over those images, which mask the monstrous or whether, if we do, then far from getting rid of the callous, the cruel, and the inhumane, we stand the risk of giving these expressions a freer playground? (shrink)

Autoritarismo, particularismo, fanatismo, catastrofismo, terrorismo, solucionismo... son las caras de una amplia reaccion antiilustrada a la actual crisis de civilizacion. Nuestro presente se ve atrapado en una disyuntiva radical: o condenarse o salvarse. Tras esta alternativa se esconde una rendicion. Temiendo el apocalipsis o anhelando un salvador, sea un lider, un dios o un robot, estamos renunciando a la libertad y a la dignidad de la experiencia humana, estamos renunciando a la emancipacion. La pregunta que late en este ensayo es: (...) por que nos creemos tan facilmente estos relatos? Y la cuestion que se plantea es: como combatir esta fe ciega y sus formas de opresion? Desde este doble interrogante, se apuesta por una nueva ilustracion radical, es decir, por luchar contra las credulidades de nuestro tiempo y contra el temor y el oportunismo que las alimentan."--Amazon.com. (shrink)

How are we to understand religion? It is undeniable that religion, and religious motivations, have played a very large role in shaping world events. As such, the question of how to understand religion has become increasingly urgent. At one extreme are those who adopt a comprehensive scientific naturalism. They approach religious beliefs and practices in such a way as to reduce them to nonreligious social or psychological factors; for them religion is part of an ideology or an infantile wish projection (...) that must be outgrown. At the other extreme are many of the religious believers themselves, who take their own religion as absolute truth and take themselves to be in a privileged epistemic position to apprehend it. Both extremes are dangerous: the first because it fails to take both religion and the religious drive seriously, and so ignores an integral facet of human life; the second because it is exemplary of the dangers of religion itself, which can take absolutist and Manichean forms. When religion does take such a form, it degenerates into idolatry, for it mistakes what must always remain a finite and conditioned apprehension of the transcendent for the transcendent ground itself. Often coupled with such a mistake comes a failure to recognize the validity of other perspectives, as well as a violent exclusion of everything that is other or unfamiliar. (shrink)

In this article I argue that Kant’s understanding of the universality of radical evil is best understood in the context of human sociality. Because we are inherently social beings, the nature of the human community we find ourselves in has a determinative influence on the sorts of persons we are, and the kinds of choices we can make. We always begin in evil. This does not vitiate responsibility, since through reflection we can become aware of our situation and envision ourselves (...) as members of a different community, one with different expectations, making genuine virtue possible. This understanding of radical evil helps to make sense of Kant’s high regard for the church in Religion. (shrink)

Edith Stein comes alive through these warm, totally attentive letters. She joins a deeply sensitive heart with her keen intelligence, revealing herself to be a wise mentor and a caring friend available to anyone who approached her. Here we learn what was truly important to her: the total well-being of those who treasured her letters enough to preserve them even while suffering the havoc of war and oppression. This volume offers the first English translation of the majority of her (...) surviving letters, with 4 photos and a fully linked index of recipients. (shrink)